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Abstract: Incentive models are becoming increasingly 
popular in Mobile Peer to Peer Networks (M-P2P) as these 
models entice node participation in return for a virtual 
currency to combat free riding and to effectively manage 
constraint resources in the network. Many routing protocols 
proposed are based on best effort data traffic policy, such as 
the shortest route selection (hop minimization). Using 
virtual currency to find a cost effective optimal route from 
the source to the destination, while considering Quality of 
Service (QoS) aspects such as bandwidth and service 
capacity constraints for data delivery, remains a challenging 
task due to the presence of multiple paths and service 
providers. Modeling the network as a directed weighted 
graph and using the cost acquired from the price function as 
an incentive to pay the intermediate nodes in M-P2P 
networks to forward data, we develop a Game theoretic 
approach based on stochastic games to find an optimal route 
considering QoS aspect. The performance of our routing 
protocol is evaluated and compared with some existing 
routing protocols and the result shows that our protocol 
proves to be efficient compared to shortest-path DSR and 
multiple paths SMR in terms of average response time, 
energy and bandwidth utilization in the network. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Mobile Peer to Peer Network (M-P2P) is a dynamic set of 
co-operating peers communicate by sending messages either 
through a single hop using a direct wireless link or through 
multiple hops using a series of wireless links.  Wireless links 
between the communicating nodes can fail and thus, can 
disconnect two nodes. It can occur when a communicating 
node leaves the network or move such that they are not in 
the transmission range of each other. In M-P2P networks, 
each peer is not only responsible for sending and receiving 
its own data, but it also has to forward packets from other 
peers. M-P2P networks have advantages compared to the 
conventional wireless networks such as rapid deployment, 
robustness, flexibility and support for mobility, which are 
useful in a wider range of applications where temporary 
networks are needed or there is lack of infrastructure.  Some 
of the peers in these networks may be critical from the point 
of view of survivability. In other words, their failure can 
cause temporary disruptions in the network either due to 
their strategic location in the topology or the data they carry. 
To increase the network life time, nodes with scare 
resources such as battery power will demand a high cost to 
route so that they can provide services for the longer time.  
A peer could be selfish and save its resources by not 
cooperating. That is, instead of forwarding the packets to 
others, a peer could use the resources of others in 
forwarding only self-originated packets. In battlefield 
operations, though the nodes naturally co-operate, but at the 
same time, nodes should drop some of the route requests if 
those nodes have a high cost to forward a packet. This could 
be due to the importance of the node’s existence for a longer 
period which is critical for the successful completion of the 
mission. Therefore, it has to preserve the energy and 
forward only selective packets.    
Economic models [MMK] play an important role to avoid 
selfishness and promote co-operation among the peers. 
Every peer that is a part of the route is rewarded with an 
incentive (in terms of virtual currency) to forward the packet 
to the next peer in the route. The protocol discussed in 
[WCK] focuses on the problem of on demand routing in 
resource rationed ad hoc networks. This approach shows 
performance gains in terms of data throughput and energy 
consumption but it only succeeds in finding a shortest 
possible route like [BJM] in terms of lowest cost expressed 
in virtual currency. The protocol described in [WCK] can be 
categorized as a routing protocol based on best-effort data 
traffic policy, as it completely relies on finding the best 
route in terms of cost. Our approach takes into account QoS 
factors such as available bandwidth, energy used and service 
capacity, which not only helps in finding a low cost route 
but also finds a path which has less congestion in the route 
(more available bandwidth and less workload). As the 
available bandwidth at a node gives information about 
traffic condition itself, so using this information helps in 
finding an optimal route. 
By modeling the network as a directed weighted graph and 
using the cost determined from the price function as an 
incentive to pay intermediate nodes based on the cost of 
transmission directly related with the battery usage, we 
develop a Game theoretic approach based on stochastic 
games to find the next hop to finally build an optimal cost 
route. We will also formulate a capacity function which 
provides QoS support such as bandwidth available, energy 
used and service capacity in M-P2P networks to forward 
data. The simulation results show that our proposed 
Incentive based Routing Protocol (IRP) for single and 
multiple paths show a better performance in terms of 
average response time, bandwidth availability and energy 
utilization in the network compared to the Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR) [BJM] for the shortest path and Split 
Multipath Routing (SMR) [LG] .  
II. RELATED WORK 
Several routing algorithms for M-P2P networks, with their 
advantages and disadvantages have been proposed in [SGF]. 
Dynamic Source Routing [DSR] (reactive routing) based on 
the concept of source routing, Ad Hoc on Demand Distance 
Vector routing [SGF] (reactive algorithm) where every hop 
of the route maintains the next hop information by its own 
and Zone routing protocol [ZRP] which combines proactive 
and reactive elements are presented. Various incentive 
mechanisms [CN] have been proposed to promote 
 
2009 Tenth International Conference on Mobile Data Management: Systems, Services and Middleware





selflessness and to foster co-operation in the network. 
[MMK] discusses economic incentive models and their 
usefulness for extending existing solutions to entice node 
participation and handling of resource constraints. 
Hierarchical Routing [BJM, SGF] in resource rationed ad 
hoc network has been addressed in [WCK]. Many game 
theory approaches have been studied in [TS], introducing 
games such as co-operative games and non-cooperative 
games. [DLC] proposes a model for resource management 
in competitive wireless networks, where the interaction 
between the service provider and the users is modeled as a 
non co-operative game.  
           III. MOBILE P2P SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
Assume that a M-P2P network consists of n peers and each 
peer communicates in omni-direction and to start with, they 
all have the same transmission power with a circle of 
transmission range D. All the links are bi-directional. We 
model M-P2P network as a directed weighted graph G= (V, 
E, wij), where V denotes the set of vertices (peers), E the 
edges (wireless links) on the graph and wij, the weight on the 
edge E from vi to vj. The link between vi and vj exists if and 
only if these nodes are in the transmission range D. The 
weight on each edge is defined as the cost of communication 
from one node to the other. Here, we give some of the 
definitions used in the system architecture. 
Broker nodes (BN):  These backbone nodes are the 
dominant nodes of the virtual backbone network.  
Access point nodes (APN): These nodes are the nodes which 
are at one hop distance from the broker nodes. These nodes 
act as the access point for all other non back bone nodes in 
the network to connect to a broker node. 
Non Broker nodes (NBN): All nodes other than the broker 
and access point nodes are the non broker nodes in the 
network. 
Link Failure frequency (LFF): This parameter represents the 
total number of link failures/ losses of a particular node in a 
fixed time. 
Link Failure frequency System Threshold (LFFth): This 
parameter represents the system threshold that sets the 
preferred level of link losses for the backbone nodes. 
There are two very important aspects that advocate the use 
of a broker based system. The first major set of advantages 
is due to the following facts: 1) Scalability can be achieved 
when network becomes larger, as every newly joined node 
connects to the backbone structure 2) Response time for 
locating services reduces, as every query processes through 
the broker and these brokers has the current routing 
information and 3) Servers (peers) are not flooded with the 
service requests, as every service requests pass through the 
broker. The second advantage follows from the utilization of 
the virtual backbones or clusters for improving the 
efficiency and quality of routing protocols. These two 
important aspects makes the broker based architecture not 
only feasible but a preferred architecture for routing in M-
P2P networks. 
3.1 SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
Backbone network nodes are selected from a subset of the 
network nodes to form a relatively stable set. It discovers the 
paths between broker nodes, and adapts to the topology 
changes by adding/removing nodes into/from the set. 
Initially, every node is a non back bone (Non Broker) node. 
Before deciding on their role in the network, these nodes 
collect their neighborhood information by sending 
messages, for a time period say T. At the end of the waiting 
period T and considering the LFF information, any node 
which satisfies the stability constraint (LFF < LFFth) joins 
the virtual backbone network and identified as the relatively 
stable node (checking with the link loss threshold (LFFth) 
helps to avoid the nodes with a lot of link losses relative to 
the backbone nodes). We term the nodes forming the back 
bone as Broker nodes. The other nodes still keeps on waiting 
for the messages in the network for the next waiting period 
T. At any point during the waiting period, if these nodes get 
messages directly from the Broker nodes, these nodes 
associates itself with the broker node, hence termed as 
APN’s.(Access Point Nodes). These nodes can join the 
backbone network based on its LFF information in the next 
waiting period by satisfying the stability constraint. All 
nodes other than the BN’s or APN’s in the network are 
called as NBN’s (Non Broker Nodes). These nodes interact 
with the broker nodes through the access point nodes which 
are the direct contact to the Broker nodes. Hence, every 
NBN has to check for the APN in its transmission range in 
order to interact with the BN or else find NBN’s in its 
transmission range which has APN in its transmission range. 
Given any two broker nodes, three kinds of virtual links are 
possible: 1) Single hop virtual link, where two broker nodes 
are directly connected i.e. the broker nodes are at a 1-hop 
distance, 2) 2-hop virtual link, where an APN exists between 
the two broker nodes. When there exists two APN’s 
between any two broker nodes, they are at a 3-hop distance 
and hence it is called a 3-hop virtual link. We assume that a 
maximum of 3-hop distance is possible along the virtual link 
of two broker nodes when the network is large enough.  
Every backbone node keeps the routing information of the 
BN’s in its vicinity or transmission range. If no BN exists in 
the transmission range it keeps the information of APN’s 
located in its range to communicate with the BN’s. Every 
node (i) that is a service provider has to register with its 
corresponding BN. If node i want to register its service, it 
has to register with the BN associated with it, assuming i as 
a non broker node. If the node i is already a BN, it registers 
the service at itself. Any time the location of the service 
provider node changes; it has to register its service with the 
corresponding BN and unregistering the service at the 
previous BN. 
     IV. INCENTIVE BASED ROUTING PROTOCOL 
When a source node VS initiates a request for a data item d 
stored at a node VD , all the nodes in the route co-operate in 
forwarding the data item to the next node to finally deliver 
the data to the source node VS. A price p is associated at 
each intermediate node as the forwarding cost of the data 
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 item d. In the process, each node on the route is paid Virtual 
Currency (VC) based on a cost function associated for 
forwarding the packets. Using the virtual currency, available 
bandwidth and work load at each node, an algorithm using 
the Game theory is designed to find an optimal route to 
service the request. To calculate the cost in terms of virtual 
currency over an edge, we will develop an equation based 
on various network parameters. 
  4.1 PARAMETERS AND PRICE FUNCTION 
Bandwidth: This parameter indicates how many free 
bandwidth slots a node possesses for forwarding the data. 
Each free slot denotes the available bandwidth at a node 
measured in KB (Kilo Bytes).  
Virtual Currency (VC): It is calculated using a price 
function based on several parameters. Many parameters 
could be considered, but we confine ourselves to the 
following: 
Transmission Power ( ): This involves the transmission 
power (battery power) utilized in forwarding the data packet 
from the transmitting node to the next immediate node. 
Receiving Power ( ): It is the power involved in receiving a 
data packet at a particular node. 
Euclidean Distance (e): It is the aerial distance between any 
two nodes in the network. This can be calculated based on 
the signal strength of the transmitting peer. 
Bandwidth (B): This represents the frequency in which these 
peer’s operate. 
Elapsed Time (t): It is the time allowed for a mobile peer to 
respond, after which the peer assumes that the packet is lost. 
The transmitting peer has to resend the packet or opt for a 
different route. 
Table 4.1: Summary of the notations 
Notation Significance 
 Transmission power of a node 
 Receiving power of a node 
 Antenna gains of the transmission and receiving 
nodes,   
 Rectangular area of the antenna aperture in cm2 
 Wavelength 
    e Euclidean distance 
 Constant (the speed of propagation of the wave) 
 Weight on an edge 
 Signal Strength 
 
The total cost incurred on an edge of a shortest path between 
any two intermediate nodes is defined as  
 
According to the Friis Transmission [FTE]  equation, the 
ratio of power received by the receiving antenna  to the 
power input to the transmitting antenna  is given by
                     
  where for simplicity, we assume that 
communication is using the same protocol such as 802.11g 
and the range of frequency f is proportional to the 
bandwidth B. Now the above formula reduces to  
 
We formulate the cost equation into three cases:  
(Cost at the source node) At the Source node (data 
requesting node), the total cost constitutes to only the 
transmission power of the source node, i.e, as it 
does not have a previous node and , where  are 
the current, next and previous nodes respectively. 
(Cost at an intermediate node):  At any given intermediate 
node if  is the transmitting power and  the receiving 
power of that node, then the total power used in transmitting 
and receiving a packet is   
=  
       where  are 
the current, next   and previous nodes respectively 
(Cost at the destination node): At the Destination node(data 
serving node), the total cost constitutes to only the receiving 
power of the node i.e.,  
 where  are the 
current, next and   previous nodes respectively 
If  is the signal strength then Euclidean distance  can be 
calculated as   and  calculated in the equations 
above is used as the virtual currency cost to forward the 
packets through the intermediate nodes  
4.2 CALCULATION OF TRANSMISSION POWER 
We use the signal strength and propagation function to 
calculate the transmit power of a peer,  
i.e   where  is the propagation 
function defined over , is the set of 
locations of the peers over a plane and gives the loss 
in bandwidth B due to propagation at location  , when 
a packet is originated from location . Let the distance 
between  be and  be the threshold distance then 
 can be defined as 
 
  
The value of  is usually between 1 and 5 depending on the 
environment. Hence, the transmission power is defined as 
 
4.3 INCENTIVE BASED ROUTING PROTOCOL 
USING GAME THERORY  
All the nodes in the network are the players of the game. 
Based on each other’s decision making behavior, a policy or 
strategy is developed which helps in finding the best 
possible route. We fix our outcome as finding the 
destination peer and look forward to end the game with that 
desired outcome. The preferences of a peer can be expressed 
with a utility function, which maps every consequence to a 
real number. When a peer makes a decision, it chooses one 







peer. Sometimes these actions can be defined as the 
probabilistic distribution which is dependent on the game’s 
behavior, whether it provides the complete information or 
not. The set of all actions taken by a peer to reach a possible 
outcome can be defined as a strategy. At the beginning of 
each stage, the game is in some state and the peers select 
their actions. Each peer receives a payoff (virtual currency) 
that depends on the current state and the chosen actions. The 
game then moves to a new random state whose distribution 
depends on the previous state and the actions chosen by the 
peer. The procedure is repeated at each new state and the 
game continues for a finite number of stages until it reaches 
a termination stage and an optimal route is found.  
To formulate the game in the M-P2P scenario, we consider a 
discrete time stochastic process, Markov Decision Process 
(MDP) characterized by a set of states. Each state defines 
the state of the mobile peer. For each state there are several 
actions from which decision maker must choose. Any action 
on a state, results in the change of state for the peer. For a 
game in any state in S, the application of Action A, will 
result in a new state . This is determined by a 
transition function   which is based on the transition 
probabilities. Formally, MDP is defined as,  
  I. A finite state space  
 II. A finite set of controls   for each state  
III. Transition probabilities  that are 
equal to the probability of next state being  after applying 
control  in state . 
IV. A cost  associated to   and   
Table 4.2: Summary of notations 
Notation Significance 
 A state in the finite state space 
 A successor state of the state   
   Set of controls for the state  
 
Cost associated with the state  and the 
control u, calculated from the 
virtual currency price function 
 Available bandwidth of a node in state  
 Strategy or policy, a finite set of sequence of controls 
 Cost associated with the policy 
 Transition probability 
As discussed in Section 3, we consider a MP2P network as a 
directed weighted graph, with a cost assigned to each arc 
(edge) of the graph. The game is played among the peers 
with a peer acting either as a source node, intermediate node 
or a destination node. A peer as a decision maker can be in 
one of the states . We represent each 
state as the combination of peers from the source to any 
intermediate or destination peer. For example, we say that 
the game is in state  if the game has traversed through the 
peers say . Then the state  is represented as 
.so every time a peer is reached, the game is moved 
to a new state and the state is represented as described 
above. The problem now reduces to finding a path from a 
graph with a set of states and cost associated with each 
transition (from one state to the other). This can be treated 
as a stochastic shortest path problem to select a successor 
state  at each state , such that 
  is an edge, and the path formed by a 
sequence of successor states starting at any state  
terminates at the destination state  and has a length with 
minimum sum of costs over all paths that start at  and 
terminate at .  
A stochastic shortest path problem is an MDP problem in 
which the state space  is such that 
 is the starting state and  the destination state. Each state 
is associated with a finite set of controls . The system 
dynamics are controlled by transition probabilities that maps 
states and controls to states. Every time the player leaves the 
state, a cost  is incurred which is associated with  
where ,  and the available free bandwidth 
(a QoS factor) is also considered. A strategy or 
policy  (for a route) is a finite sequence   of 
functions where  maps states to controls, so that the player 
applies the control in state . The cost  
associated with policy , when system starts at  (initial 
state) is  where the expected 
value E is induced from the probability distribution of 
transition probabilities for some k. The cost for a policy 
is further refined by eliminating the expectation 
operator. where 
 is the cost on an edge and  is the 
transition probability, which is based on the virtual currency 
cost, bandwidth, Service Capacity and the type of node (BN, 
APN or NBN, based on Link Failure Frequency defined 
earlier). All these QoS factors are considered in defining the 
transition probabilities. Initially, we categorize each of these 
factors into three different levels {low, med, high} 
depending on their values. We define a probability function 
for each of these levels and, the combination of all the 
probabilities with different factors would determine the 
transition probability. The probability function is defined in 
terms of the four independent probabilistic functions 
described below. 
 where, , 
 
  and 
.  
We define ) as the probability of reaching a state  
among the set of states identified and   as the 
probability of reaching a state  among the set of states 
identified with a virtual currency VC (VC can be in any of 
the three levels {low, med, high}).  Similarly  
as the probability of reaching a state among the set of 
states identified with a bandwidth BW (BW can be in any of 
the three levels {low, med, high}),  as the 
probability of reaching a state  among the set of states 
identified with a workload WL (WL can be in any of the 
three levels {low, med, high}) and  as the 
probability of reaching a state  among the set of states 
identified with a node type TY ( TY can be in any of the 
S
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three levels {BN, APN, NBN}). For example let’s consider 
that the virtual currency is divided into three different levels 
{low, med, high} with probability of selecting an edge of 
low cost  is 3/6, medium is 2/6 and high is 1/6. As we need 
to consider an edge of low cost we give a higher probability 
for the cost being low. Similarly we define the probabilities 
for all the QoS factors. This can be seen in the table 4 
defined below. The node is categorized as BN, APN and 
NBN as defined in Section 3.1. Using this categorization, 
we define probabilities for the selection of a node. The 
probability for selecting a Broker Node (BN) is higher 
(based on the network architecture, LFF) than that of APN 
which is higher than NBN. The probabilities for BN, APN 
and NBN are 4/7, 2/7 and 1/7, respectively.  
The transition probability of an edge is defined as the 
product of the four independent factors listed above. For 
example selecting an edge which has low cost, medium 
bandwidth, medium Service Capacity and the node type as 
BN will have the probability of (3/6)(2/9)(2/8)(4/7) i.e. 1/63. 
From the Game theory approach defined above, we select an 
edge which has the highest transition probability over the set 
of all possible edges. Hence, it is clear that the transition 
probabilities of selecting an edge with low cost, high 
bandwidth, low Service Capacity and node type of BN is 
always higher ( (3/6)(6/9)(5/8)(4/7) i.e. 5/21) than that of 
selecting an edge with high cost, low bandwidth, high 
Service Capacity and node type NBN is always lower 
(which is (1/6)(1/9)(1/8)(1/7)  i.e. 1/3024).  
A situation might arise where the transition probabilities of 
edges may be equal. In such a scenario, to select an edge, we 
prioritize the aforementioned QoS factors in the following 
order, type of node, virtual currency, bandwidth and Service 
Capacity.  A higher priority is given to the node type in 
order to select the most reliable path, as the type of node is 
classified in terms of LFF (Link Failure Frequency). It is 
unlikely that the transition probabilities of all the QoS 
factors are equal and if such a case arises, selection of any of 
the edges proves to be fruitful. 
There are always one or more policies that are better than or 
equal to all the others. These are called the optimal policies. 
We denote them by . The optimality is achieved when  
 where , for every policy  
 
The capacity/free bandwidth for the policy is calculated 
based on the available free slots at a node. The bandwidth at 
a node is divided into slots and each node maintains the slot 
information of its neighbor by transferring messages. The 
free bandwidth between any two nodes is denoted by  
where X, Y are the nodes. To calculate the free bandwidth 
we take into consideration , which gives the 
available free slots at a node X. If the nodes are at a single 
hop distance:   
If the nodes are separated by a multi hop distance: 
 
The generalized form is the recursive equation of a 
minimization function i.e.,  
 
. 
                 Table 4.3: Summary of Notations 
Notation Significance 
 Probability of reaching a state  from state  
on control u 
 Transition probability of the virtual currency to 
reach a state given a state   
 Transition probability of the bandwidth to reach a 
state given a state   
 Transition probability of the workload to reach a 
state given a state   
 Transition probability of node type given a state 
 
 
Table 4.4: Probabilities of different levels of QoS Factors 
Probability Low Med High 
VC 3/6 2/6 1/6 
Bandwidth 1/9 2/9 6/9 
Service Capacity 5/8 2/8 1/8 
 
Service Capacity is also one of the QoS factors which we 
consider in defining an optimal policy. We define Service 
Capacity in terms of workload at a node. If a node is 
processing more number of requests at a given time we 
consider the Service Capacity to be high and do not prefer to 
opt that node in the route. The optimal policy is achieved 
based on the cost, free bandwidth and service capacity i.e. 
minimum cost, minimum service capacity and maximum 
free bandwidth.  
                              V. SIMULATION 
We built a simulation environment in Java to study the 
performance by conducting experiments on the Incentive 
based routing protocol (IRP) described in Section 4 and 
comparing it to the Shortest Path Dynamic source routing 
(SP-DSR) [BJM] protocol. The simulation area is 
approximately 1000 X 600 meters and it can afford a range 
of 30 to 150 peers in the network. The maximum connection 
distance between any two peers is 100 m. The queries are 
randomly generated and it is done at an average of 5 queries 
per second. The maximum bandwidth between any two 
peers is 128 kbps and 8 kbps being the minimum.  The 
movement of the nodes is handled by implementing the 
random way point model (RWP) [BRS] . In RWP, each 
node moves along a zig zag line from one way point to the 
other. The random way points are uniformly distributed over 
the given area and all the nodes tend to converge at the 
center. RWP chooses a destination and speed for a node 
randomly and independently, and the node will keep moving 
at that speed until it reaches that destination. We randomly 
choose speed which is uniformly distributed in the interval 
[1, Vmax).  
The formation of the node cluster (Broker architecture) is 





(CDS) [LZT+]  model.  Several algorithms for the CDS 
formation have been discussed in [BDC] , we have used 
Steiner tree based CDS construction to define Broker nodes 
in the network. As discussed in Section 3.1 all the nodes 
connected to these Broker Nodes are the Access Point 
Nodes and all the other nodes are classified as Non Broker 
Nodes. The effectiveness of the protocol can be evaluated 
by performing experiments on the network. The network is 
divided into clusters of various sizes. Each cluster will have 
three types of nodes Non Broker Node, Access Point Node 
and the Broker Node, which acts as the cluster head. A 
randomly selected node from one of the clusters requests a 
service in the network and the service is processed using the 
proposed Game theoretic approach.  
Table 5.1: Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Range 
Simulation area 1000 X 600 m2 
Number of peers 30 ~ 150 
Maximum connection distance 100 m 
Bandwidth between peers 8 ~ 128 Kbps 
Queries generated per sec 5 
              5.1 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION  
The results are studied to analyze the metrics such as 
bandwidth usage, response time, average hop count and 
energy utilization and compare these metrics with those of 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [BJM] protocol. 
5.1.1 Average response time vs. Number of peers 
We define response time as the time required to successfully 
find an optimal route from source to the destination. We 
perform the experiment by increasing the number of peers in 
the network from 30 to 150. Figure 1 shows the plot of 
average response time against the number of peers. We 
observe that as the number of peers’ increases, the 
performance IRP gets better compared to the shortest path 
DSR due to the presence of the broker peer architecture that 
uses less number of nodes in processing a request. 
 
Figure 1: Average response time with increasing number of 
peers in the network 
Initially when the size of the network is small, we see that, 
both the protocols works equally better. When the size of the 
network increases, a slight decrease in the response time is 
observed in our protocol compared to DSR. This is due to 
the performance of the broker peer architecture, which uses 
lesser number of peers in processing the request. This 
experiment shows that the response time in our protocol is 
decreased compared to DSR. Considering the scenario of 
finding multiple maximal disjoint paths to the destination, 
we observe that IRP for multi paths still performs better 
compared to split multipath routing (SMR). There is a slight 
increase in the response time observed compared to IRP for 
single optimal route as finding maximal disjoint paths costs 
time over finding all the routes.   
5.1.2 Average hop count vs. increasing number of peers 
 Hop Count is defined as the number of hops a packet takes, 
starting from the source peer to reach the destination peer. 
We increase the hop count as the packet reaches each 
intermediate peer on its way to the destination. Figure 7 
shows the comparison between the hop counts by Incentive 
based routing protocol (IRP) and DSR with the increase of 
the number of peers in the network.  
From the Figure 2, we observe that the average hop count 
for IRP is little high compared to the DSR. Though not a 
significant difference is observed, the difference is because 
of the incorporated QoS factors in finding the route. A slight 
increase in the average hop count is observed because of the 
argument that, minimizing the hop-count maximizes the 
distance traveled by each hop, which is likely to minimize 
signal strength and maximize the loss ratio. 
 
   Figure 2: Average Hop Count vs. the number of peers 
 
    Figure 3: Average Hop Count vs. the number of requests 
Even if the best route is a minimum hop-count route, in a 
dense network there may be many routes of the same 
minimum length, with widely varying qualities; the arbitrary 
choice made by most minimum hop-count metrics is not 
likely to be the best. As IRP selects the route based on the 
price calculated over several parameters that include signal 
strength, transmission power and receiving power, and a low 
cost route is always selected, the route may contain more 
number of hops with less cost compared to that of DSR 
which may contain minimum hops with a high cost. When 
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 path is used in routing the packets to the destination, the 
average hop count in multipath IRP, SMR[LG]  increases 
compared to IRP and SP-DSR.   
5.1.2.1 Average Hop Count vs. Number of requests 
Figure 3 shows a graph of average hop count plotted against 
the number of requests in a network. The experiment is 
conducted over a network of size 60 with the increasing 
number of requests. The readings are taken for every 10 
requests. The irregularity of the graph is due to the 
randomness in the query generation. 
The graph for average hop count for the increasing number 
of requests shows  a slight difference in the hop count as the 
number of requests increases.  Thus, we conclude that 
increasing the number of requests from 20 to 120 only 
increase the hopcount by about one and hence, the method 
scale well with increasing the number of requests. 
5.1.2.2  Path Optimality 
We define path optimaility as the difference between the 
number of hops a packet took to reach its destination and the 
length of the shortest path that physically existed through 
the network when the packet was originated. 
Figure 4 shows the scatter graph pointing the differences in 
the hop count of both the protocols. The readings are taken 
for a network of size 60 while increasing the number of 
requests. Each point on the graph shows the difference 
between the hop counts of  IRP and DSR. 
 
Figure 4: Difference between the number of hops to reach 
the destination and the length of the shortest path that 
physically existed (IRP vs DSR). 
 
Figure 5: Difference between the average hops in multiple 
paths and the average length of the shortest paths physically 
existed (multipath-IRP vs SMR) 
Let d denotes the difference between the shortest path and 
the length of the optimal route actually taken by the packet. 
A difference of 0 means that the packet has taken a shortest 
path while a difference greater than 0 means that it has taken 
a path longer than the shortest path i.e. it took extra hops to 
reach the destination. Figure 4 shows the average value of d 
between IRP and SP-DSR and Figure 5 shows the average 
value of d between multipath IRP and SMR. We observe 
that most of the points fall in the range [0,1]. This means 
that the optimal route is close to the shortest path. As the 
network size is increased we expect a slight increase in the 
range of d.  This plot helps in understanding the ability of 
the optimal routing protocol to efficiently use the network 
resources in finding the optimal cost path despite a slight 
variation in the hop count. 
5.1.3  Available Bandwidth vs. Number of requests 
We define available bandwidth between any two nodes (or 
over the path) as the set of available free slots between 
them. Figure 6 shows the available bandwidth over the path 
to destination, varying the network of sizes 30, 45 and 60. 
The readings were taken for 11th, 21st and so on requests. 
Initially the requests are randomly generated with a 
difference of 10 queries ranging from 10 to 50  in the 
network of varying size and the readings for 11th, 21st, and 
so on requests are taken. The plot shows that initially there 
is dip in the bandwidth available, this is because of the 
increase in the number of requests utilizing the bandwidth. 
However, as more and more requests gets satisfied faster, 
more bandwidth becomes available to process additional 
requests. Hence, we observe a rise in the available 
bandwidth later on with increase in the number of requests. 
Figure 7 shows the readings of the available bandwidth for 
11th, 21st, so on requests in the network of varying size for 
multi path IRP. Comparing the  graph of figure 7 with that 
of figure 11, we observe that more bandwidth is available 
for multi path IRP than that of IRP for single route. This is 
because of the presence of multiple routes to the destination. 
Hence, we can infer that multi path IRP performs better 
compared to the IRP in terms of available bandwidth. 
5.1.4  Energy Utilization 
Energy utilization is defined as the amount of battery power, 
transmission power and reception power a node uses in 
processing a request. As we define our price based on these 
parameters in VC price function (defined in Section 4.1), we 
infer that energy utilized in processing a request to be the 
cost observed along the path. Hence we plot energy in terms 
of virtual currency derived from the VC price function. 
 
 
Figure 6:  Available Bandwidth vs. the number of requests 
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Figure 8 shows the graph to read the energy utilized in the 
network to process a request. The readings are taken by 
increasing the number of peers in the network ranging 30 to 
150. As IRP focuses on finding the low cost path compared 
to DSR, we observe that the graph of IRP lies below the 
shortest path DSR. Initially when the network size is small, 
the difference in the energy is less. But, as the network size 
is increased we see that IRP performs efficiently in terms of 
energy utilization as the focus is on finding the low cost 
route in terms of cost unlike SP-DSR which focuses on 
finding a path with minimum hops which may cost higher. 
Considering the multi paths for IRP and SMR, we observe 
that there is slight increase in the energy utilization 
compared to the previous models. This is because of the fact 
that multiple routes are considered from source to the 
destination. This increases the average cost to the 
destination, which results in the increase of energy. 
 
 
Fig ure7: Available bandwidth vs. the number of requests 
for Multipath IRP 
 
 
            Figure 8: Energy utilization in the network 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we propose a game theory approach for 
finding an optimal cost routing where each peer gets an 
incentive to forward the data while discovering a route. In 
addition, it takes into consideration the QoS factors such as 
energy usage, the bandwidth available, service capacity, and 
the link reliability in calculating for the transition 
probabilities to select the next hop peer in the path. Our 
simulation study validates that IRP is an effective approach 
to find an optimal low cost route compared to the shortest 
path DSR for the average response time, average hop count, 
path optimality, available bandwidth and energy utilization 
in the network, and IRP proves to perform better for all the 
metrics though a slight difference is observed while 
studying the average hop count.  
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